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Send our love to Chelsea, Marc and Grandpa. Can’t wait to meet Charlotte. On Aug 19, 2014 9:22 AM, “H” <hrod17@clintonemail.com> wrote: Agree but there may be opportunities as the Iraqi piece improves. Also, any idea whose fighters attacked Islamist positions in Tripoli, Libya? Worth analyzing for future purposes. *From*: John Podesta [mailto:john.podesta@gmail.com] *Sent*: Tuesday, August 19, 2014 09:19 AM *To*: H *Subject*: Re: Here’s what I mentioned Hit send too soon. Meant to say Syria elements are vexing. On Aug 19, 2014 9:17 AM, “John Podesta” <john.podesta@gmail.com> wrote:> I think we are headed down this path in Iraq, but the Syria elements are> On Aug 17, 2014 3:50 PM, “H” <hrod17@clintonemail.com> wrote:>>> Note: Sources include Western intelligence, US intelligence and sources>> in the region.>>>>>>>> 1. With all of its tragic aspects, the advance of ISIL>> through Iraq gives the U.S. Government an opportunity to change the way it>> deals with the chaotic security situation in North Africa and the Middle>> East. The most important factor in this matter is to make use of>> intelligence resources and Special Operations troops in an aggressive>> manner, while avoiding the old school solution, which calls for more>> traditional military operations. In Iraq it is important that we engage>> ISIL using the resources of the Peshmerga fighters of the Kurdish Regional>> Government (KRG), and what, if any, reliable units exist in the Iraqi>> Army. The Peshmerga commanders are aggressive hard fighting troops, who>> have long standing relationships with CIA officers and Special Forces>> operators. However, they will need the continued commitment of U.S.>> personnel to work with them as advisors and strategic planners, the new>> generation of Peshmerga commanders being largely untested in traditional>> combat. That said, with this U.S. aid the Kurdish troops can inflict a>> real defeat on ISIL.>>>>>>>> 2. It is important that once we engage ISIL, as we have now>> done in a limited manner, we and our allies should carry on until they are>> driven back suffering a tangible defeat. Anything short of this will be>> seen by other fighters in the region, Libya, Lebanon, and even Jordan, as>> an American defeat. However, if we provide advisors and planners, as well>> as increased close air support for the Peshmerga, these soldiers can defeat>> ISIL. They will give the new Iraqi Government a chance to organize itself,>> and restructure the Sunni resistance in Syria, moving the center of power>> toward moderate forces like the Free Syrian Army (FSA). In addition to air>> support, the Peshmerga also need artillery and armored vehicles to deal>> with the tanks and other heavy equipment captured from the Iraqi army by>> ISIL.>>>>>>>> 3. In the past the USG, in an agreement with the Turkish General Staff,>> did not provide such heavy weapons to the Peshmerga, out of a concern that>> they would end up in the hands of Kurdish rebels inside of Turkey. The>> current situation in Iraq, not to mention the political environment in>> Turkey, makes this policy obsolete. Also this equipment can now be>> airlifted directly into the KRG zone.>>>>>>>> 4. Armed with proper equipment, and working with U.S. advisors, the>> Peshmerga can attack the ISIL with a coordinated assault supported from the>> air. This effort will come as a surprise to the ISIL, whose leaders>> believe we will always stop with targeted bombing, and weaken them both in>> Iraq and inside of Syria. At the same time we should return to plans to>> provide the FSA, or some group of moderate forces, with equipment that will>> allow them to deal with a weakened ISIL, and stepped up operations against>> the Syrian regime. This entire effort should be done with a low profile,>> avoiding the massive traditional military operations that are at best>> temporary solutions.

While this military/para-military operation is moving>> forward, we need to use our diplomatic and more traditional intelligence>> assets to bring pressure on the governments of Qatar and Saudi Arabia,>> which are providing clandestine financial and logistic support to ISIL and>> other radical Sunni groups in the region. This effort will be enhanced by>> the stepped up commitment in the KRG. The Qataris and Saudis will be put>> in a position of balancing policy between their ongoing competition to>> dominate the Sunni world and the consequences of serious U.S. pressure. By>> the same token, the threat of similar, realistic U.S. operations will serve>> to assist moderate forces in Libya, Lebanon, and even Jordan, where>> insurgents are increasingly fascinated by the ISIL success in Iraq.>>>>>>>> 6. In the end the situation in Iraq is merely the latest and most>> dangerous example of the regional restructuring that is taking place across>> North Africa, all the way to the Turkish border. These developments are>> important to the U.S. for reasons that often differ from country to>> country: energy and moral commitment to Iraq, energy issues in Libya, and>> strategic commitments in Jordan. At the same time, as Turkey moves toward>> a new, more serious Islamic reality, it will be important for them to>> realize that we are willing to take serious actions, which can be sustained>> to protect our national interests. This course of action offers the>> potential for success, as opposed to large scale, traditional military>> campaigns, that are too expensive and awkward to maintain over time.>>>>>>>> 7. (Note: A source in Tripoli stated in confidence that when the U.S.>> Embassy was evacuated, the presence of two U.S. Navy jet fighters over the>> city brought all fighting to a halt for several hours, as Islamist forces>> were not certain that these aircraft would not also provide close ground>> support for moderate government forces.)>>>>>>>> 8. If we do not take the changes needed to make our security>> policy in the region more realistic, there is a real danger of ISIL>> veterans moving on to other countries to facilitate operations by Islamist>> forces. This is already happening in Libya and Egypt, where fighters are>> returning from Syria to work with local forces. ISIL is only the latest and>> most violent example of this process. If we don’t act to defeat them in>> Iraq something even more violent and dangerous will develop. Successful>> military operations against these very irregular but determined forces can>> only be accomplished by making proper use of clandestine/special operations>> resources, in coordination with airpower, and established local allies.>> There is, unfortunately, a narrow window of opportunity on this issue, as>> we need to act before an ISIL state becomes better organized and reaches>> into Lebanon and Jordan.>>>>>>>> 9. (Note: It is important to keep in mind that as a result of>> this policy there probably will be concern in the Sunni regions of Iraq and>> the Central Government regarding the possible expansion of KRG controlled>> territory. With advisors in the Peshmerga command we can reassure the>> concerned parties that, in return for increase autonomy, the KRG will not>> exclude the Iraqi Government from participation in the management of the>> oil fields around Kirkuk, and the Mosel Dam hydroelectric facility. At the>> same time we will be able to work with the Peshmerga as they pursue ISIL>> into disputed areas of Eastern Syria, coordinating with FSA troops who can>> move against ISIL from the North. This will make certain Basher al Assad>> does not gain an advantage from these operations. Finally, as it now>> appears the U.S. is considering a plan to offer contractors as advisors to>> the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, we will be in a position to coordinate more>> effectively between the Peshmerga and the Iraqi Army.)>>>>